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Maquiladora assembly emerged to solve a specific problem in a spe-
cific region. In the mid 1960s, it was designed to absorb unemploy-
ment and to foster industrialization at the US-Mexican border. In the
course of its development, it developed considerable dynamics with
respect to both regional distribution and technological diversification.
Beyond initial intentions, maquiladora assembly proved to be a pow-
erful instrument to foster modernization and international integration
of the Mexican economy.
Maquiladora assembly is based on factor price differentials and a fa-
vourable location with respect to the US-market. It has been devel-
oped by private agents learning to tap these potentials. They success-
fully intensified labour division among themselves. Most importantly,
they invented so-called Shelter Plan arrangements as privately mar-
keted services to overcome risk barriers to international integration. A
passive, i.e. liberal stance of economic policy proved to be supportive.
The implication for economic policy in transformation economies is
that an adequate assignment of responsibilities among market and
state is at least as important as efficient labour division among private
agents. (D20, F15)I Introduction: Border Economics and Production Sharing'
The common border of Mexico and the United States of America (US) is one of
the few places in the world where a poor and a rich country are neighbouring di-
rectly along a distance of nearly 2,000 miles (Chart I).
2 Mexico and the US are
different both with respect to their development levels and with respect to their
factor endowments. The US is relatively rich in capital but relatively poor in
cheap, low skilled labour, while in Mexico it is just opposite. This setting comes
very close to that on which the so-called Heckscher-Ohlin-Model is based. In a
Heckscher-Ohlin world, one would expect inter-industry trade to develop
strongly between the two countries such that Mexico would produce labour-in-
tensive goods and trade them against capital-intensive goods from the US.
However, international economic activity not only reflects different factor en-
dowments and development levels. It also takes account of capital and labour
mobility, different degrees of mobility as well as of regulations which may re-
strict exchange of goods and/or factors of production. Actually, the setting at
the US-Mexican border is far more complex than a simple Heckscher-Ohlin
world. Indeed, the border is closed for Mexican labour but investment capital is
mobile and restrictions to trade are in place. In this setting, the US-Mexican
Research for this paper was undertaken with support from the European Commission's Phare ACE
Program 1995 "Integrating Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Transition Countries into the
European Trade Flows and Co-operation Schemes", Project No. 94-0724-R. The paper has been
prepared for the corresponding workshop held in Trento, Italy, in March 1997. I am grateful for the
comments of workshop participants and other discussion partners.
Other borders with a similar setting are the Pearl-River-Delta in China/Hong-Kong and the North-
South border lines between Western and Central Eastern Europe. In Mexico, the border region
consists of 35 municipalities in six federal states. Almost a third of the border population is con-
centrated in Tijuana and Mexicali, both on the Californian border, and almost a fifth in the largest
border city, which is Ciudad Juarez. These three cities account for about half of the border popula-
tion.border region has brought about a particular phenomenon of economic integra-
tion: the maquiladora
3 or in-bond industry
4.
Chart 1
The term Maquila roots in the Arab language where it means measure. In Spanish it adopted the
meaning of toll. It denotes the amount of grain that farmers used to pay the miller for processing
their crop. The Mexican factories or the twin-plants were called maquiladoras, or toll manufactur-
ers as they process inputs — and use machinery — owned by a foreign investor for a fee (Bolin
1984; Mendiola 1996).
The amount of the corresponding import duty and any fine or penalty that could result should the
imported goods not be exported within the authorised time period were to be guaranteed by posting
a financial bond, hence the term "in-bond" industry, which is used as a synonym for maquiladora
industry in many instances (USITC 1990).3
Precondition and driving forces for this industry to develop are first, competi-
tive pressures on US-manufacturers fuelled by globalization, second, technical
separability of individual stages of the manufacturing process and third, signifi-
cant factor price differentials between Mexico and the US. Factor price differ-
entials, especially with respect to labour, are resulting from and maintained by
different demographic developments in Mexico and the US. Due to a rapidly
growing population, Mexico has a large and growing but relatively low-skilled
labour force. In the US in contrast, population is growing slower and becomes
increasingly educated.
5
Thus, although the world's most important sales markets for labour-intensive
consumer goods, the US has become uncompetitive in producing them. It has to
move out labour-intensive productions to low-wage countries. Mexico, com-
pared to developing countries in South East Asia, offers US-based producers an
attractive location due to even lower wages on the one hand and due to proxim-
ity on the other hand. Transportation from almost any point in the US to the
Mexican border results to be cheaper than transportation to any of the Asian or
other overseas trading partner:of the US (Grunwald 1985a). Thus, Mexico en-
joys an important advantage in locational competition.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it analyzes maquiladora-type pro-
duction sharing with respect to the national Mexican economy as well as with
respect to the role and potential of small- and medium-sized enterprises in in-
ternational integration and on the preconditions therefore. Second, it serves to
prepare the discussion, inhowfar the maquiladora case may serve as a blueprint
in designing growth-orientated development strategies for the transformation
Wages for unskilled labour are 8 to 10 USS per hour in the US, whereas only 1 to 2 US$ in Mex-
ico.economies of Central and Eastern Europe. Research for this paper is based both
on reviewing economic literature and on conducting interviews with industrial
parks managers, with a member of the National Chamber of Manufacturing In-
dustry
6 as well as with researchers of the University of Mexico City and El Co-
legio de Mexico.
II'••; Maquiladora Assembly: Beginnings and Design
The maquiladora industry was established 1965 in the framework of Mexico's
Border Industrialization Program.
7 The program was designed to integrate the
border region into the national economy by attracting foreign manufacturing
and by creating employment. Its implementation received a strong impetus as
the United States, reacting to pressure from their labour unions, terminated the
so-called Bracero Agreement which since World War II had allowed Mexican
farmworkers (braceros) to temporarily enter the US for working in the harvest.
When returning, workers partly went to their home places in the interior of the
country, partly they stayed at the border, hoping to be contracted again in the
US. The Mexican border-city Ciudad Juarez, opposite of El Paso, was heavily
Camara Nacional de la Industria de Transformacion (CANACINTRA).
The Border Industrialization Program (Programa de Industrialization Fronteriza) basically formal-
ized the establishment of maquiladora plants at the northern border cities. It did so by modifying
tariffs and customs procedures. In the border region, it allowed for foreign investment with up to
100 p.c. foreign ownership, including 100 p.c. foreign ownership to real estate, and provided ex-
emption from import tariffs for all items to be re-exported after assembly treatment. Setting up this
program implicated the first move of the Mexican government from a domestically oriented devel-
opment by means of import substitution towards and outward oriented strategy, although only with
respect to the northern border (Momemayor Martinez 1992). The 1965 Border Industrialization
Program was preceded by the so-called Border Development Program (Programa Nacional Fron-
terizo — Pronaf) issued in 1962. Pronaf addressed unemployment and social problems in the
northern border states. It was created to integrate the border with the interior of Mexico, namely to
improve the appearance and operation of the border region and to increase the awareness of Mexi-
can culture and exportable products (Bolin 1991). The program mainly provided funds for estab-
lishing physical and social infrastructure as streets, schools, etc.burdened by returning unemployed workers. At that time, however, the city had
little industry and no possibility to employ or host the people.
On this occasion and using funds made available under the Border Development
Program, a study was commissioned in order to investigate possibilities and
strategies to move towards industrialization. The study proposed to attract US
investment into manufacturing and to realize the manufacturing process in so-
called twin plants (ADL 1964).
8 The idea of the twin-plant concept is to estab-
lish a production system consisting of two plants, one on each side of the bor-
der, but both operated by a single management.' The plant on the US side would
perform .the capital- and technology-intensive parts of the process, the plant on
the Mexican side would perform the labour-intensive parts. The Mexican plant
would receive its machinery from the US and also the components to be as-
sembled. It would return the assembled, semi-finished products duty free to the
US twin plant to be finished there and then to be marketed in the US.
In essence, the twin-plant concept constitutes a specific design of international
production sharing
1
0 which combines international trade with international pro-
duction." It recognizes that the US as the world's largest consumer market offers
a huge sales potential for labour-intensive consumer goods while wages put US
In this study both the concept of a twin-plant was invented and its name was coined. Only later,
twin plants were named maquiladoras. . ...
The plant on the US side was initially conceived as the subsidiary of a parent company located
elsewhere in the US. However, this is not necessarily so. There are US companies which set up as-
sembly operation in Mexico without establishing a border-located subsidiary (Chart Al). There are
also plants in industrial parks on the US side of the border, e.g. al the El Paso airport, which are
not necessarily owned by the same companies as the co-operating assembly plants in Mexico
(Bolin 1997). •
The term "production sharing" has been coined by Peter Drucker and denotes world "economic
integration by stages of the productive process" (Drucker 1977).
According to Peter Drucker (1977) "... the old 18th-Century German term Veredelungsverkehr
(upgrading trade) describes the transaction better than any of the familiar terms of international
economics and international trade theory."producers at a competitive disadvantage. Locating labour-intensive productions
on the Mexican border combines wage cost advantages with low transportation
cost. It allows to restore US producers' competitiveness on the one side and to
employ Mexican workers on the other side. Beyond, US investors benefit from
returns on their capital investment, the Mexican economy benefits from foreign
exchange generated by exports and, in the course of time, from technology and
management know-how transferred jointly with capital investment.
As an organizational device, the study recommended to establish the Mexican
plant in a bonded manufacturing zone hosting an industrial park (ADL 1964).
Rules to bonded zones were already set in Mexican law — though scarcely
practised — as areas where any foreign inputs (machinery, equipment, raw ma-
terials, semi-finished products) may be imported duty-free. Manufactured goods
could leave the zone with duties payable only when sold on the national market
but free from duties and taxes when exported. The industrial park inside the
zone should provide manufacturers with all facilities and services they need to
set up production and should charge them with an annual rent.
1
2
Maquiladora enterprises receive no incentives from Mexican authorities but
tariff exemptions. Although incorporated in Mexico, the maquiladora is not
subject to ownership control but can be constituted and managed with up to
100 p.c. foreign capital. There are no restrictions with regard to origin of com-
ponents or profit remissions and only few restrictions to land ownership." For
Actually, the rent must cover the cost of administration as well as the cost for acquiring investment
of foreign manufacturers. This is important as banks will not lend for marketing expenditures of
the parks but will give loans only for buildings and real estate (Bolin 1997).
Since 1972, maquiladora plants can be established anywhere in the country by purchasing or leas-
ing real estate for production facilities. If land ownership is to be acquired in the "restricted zone",
i.e. within 100 kilometers along the border line or 50 kilometers inland along the coast line, the
operation has to be done under a trust agreement through a Mexican commercial bank, renewable
after 30 years (Opalin 1990).an enterprise to acquire the status of a maquiladora, it has to be approved and
registered by the Ministry of Economics'
4. US authorities grant benefits to
maquiladora assembly by applying incentive tariffs which allow duty-free entry
of US materials sent to Mexico for processing and re-entering the US for further
processing or sale." Thus, assembled and re-imported products are subject to
US taxes only for the value added which has been generated in Mexico."
According to the proposal, the first twin-plant and a new industrial park within
a bonded manufacturing zone were realized in Ciudad Juarez. Initially, it was
envisaged that the industrial park should be publicly built and managed and that
funds would be made available by the federal government. However, due to
budget constraints, the government could not provide funding. A Mexican en-
trepreneur became interested and instead, the park was established as an entirely
private enterprise: with private money and on private land. A private manage-
ment was installed responsible of promoting the park to international investors
and to finance itself out of rental income. Actually, this happened to be the
probably most important single event in the development of maquiladory-type
production sharing. It threw the switch from government involvement and inr
dustrial policy to private initiative and privately born responsibility. In short: it
left the floor to private agents.
Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Development (Secofi).
The US Offshore Assembly Provision (OAP) was instituted in 1930. It consists of two items in the
US tariff schedule. Tariff item 806.30 assesses a duty on the foreign value added of US metal
products. Item 807.00 grants duty-free entry to other US materials or components. Tariff articles
TSUS 806.30 and 807.00 are now HTSUS 9802.00.600 and 902.00.80. For definitions see, for in-
stance, Journal of the Flagstaff Institute (1995).
The US government intended to reconcile the interest of US unions concerned with domestic em-
ployment and the interest of US producers wonying about high labour cost jeopardizing their com-
petitiveness. Incentive tariffs should allow for a cost-neutral flow of materials between US enter-
prises and their foreign subsidiaries (Dillmann 1983, quoted from Nuhn 1994).Ill Growth and Development
From a modest beginning, the maquiladora industry has been continuously
growing during the past thirty years. From 1965, when twelve maquiladora
plants were established, the industry grew to 2,100 enterprises with
640,000 employees generating 5 bill. US$ of net exports in the mid 1990s
(Table 1). From 1975 to 1995, the maquiladora industry experienced an average
annual growth of 8 p.c. with respect to number of enterprises and of 12 p.c. with
respect to employment (Mendiola 1996). Its gross production grew to over
26 bill. US $ in 1995, roughly one fifth of which is value added, mainly repre-
senting the content of local labour (Tables 2 and 3). In the beginning of the
1980s, value added even had accounted for nearly a third of gross production
but declined to about 20 p.c. in the mid 1990s. It reflects an increasing value of
imported inputs, mostly, however, it is due to peso devaluation, as e.g. from
1994 to 1995:

















































































Source: INEGI, quoted from Mendiola (1996).



















































Source: Grunwald (1985a); Consejo Nacional Industria de la Maquiladora de
Exportation (1993).10





















































































Source: Banco de Mexico (1996b); INEGI (1996b).
Maquiladora assembly has made the Mexican border a fully industrialized re-
gion. Also, it began to take a role in the national economy — with respect to
production, employment, trade and foreign investment as well as with respect to
structural change and economic liberalization. In 1995, maquiladora assembly
accounted for 2 p.c. of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP). This may ap-
pear small yet equals about 10 p.c. of GDP in total manufacturing. Maquiladora
plants employed about 3 p.c. of the total active labour force, which is more than
a quarter of all jobs in Mexican manufacturing and nearly two thirds of manu-
facturing employment in the border states. Moreover, for each job created di-
rectly in a maquiladora plant, one or even two further jobs are generated indi-
rectly in other local enterprises. Thus, maquiladora assembly in total is by now
generating employment and income for up to two million people," but plays its
most important role probably with respect to foreign trade. It is Mexico's second
In 1994, total population was 93 million people.11
important export industry after oil extraction and ahead of tourism and — as
based on outward processing — its largest importer of intermediate goods. It
has acquired a share of roughly two fifth of all manufacturing exports and con-
tinuously generates trade surpluses (Table 4). In certain industries, it accounts
for even more than 80 p.c. of all US imports generated by offshore assembly
(Table Al).
Sectoral Changes
Maquiladora assembly actually covers the whole range of manufacturing indus-
tries with transport equipment, electronics and textiles being the three largest.
Textiles were important in the early beginning. Since the 1970s, electronics and
electronic machinery have been dominating (Table 5). Although electronics are
experiencing a relative decline compared to other maquiladora industries, they
remain the largest single industry even in the 1990s, still accounting for one
third of employment and nearly half of production. Transport equipment is the
second largest and the fastest growing sector, accounting now for about one
fifth of both employment and production.
However, looking at the industrial structure only within the maquiladora sector
does not yet tell the story as maquiladora industries develop quite differently
from their non-maquiladora counterparts. Mostly, they develop much stronger
dynamics. Textiles, for instance, have lost importance relative to other maquila-
dora industries but have been growing in absolute terms. This is remarkable as
in the same time the non-maquiladora textile industry has been shrinking con-
siderably (Mendiola 1996). Relatively high dynamics of maquiladora assembly
mainly result from its high degree of international integration — thus indirectly
from partial liberalization — which seeks extensive regional diversification and
forces a continuous updating of technology and organization.12






















































































Source: INEGI (1996a); Romero and Paredes (1993).
Regional Diversification
Initially, the maquiladora industry was restricted to locate exclusively at the
northern border and it strongly concentrated at certain places — Ciudad Juarez,
Tijuana, Matamoros, and Nogales became and still are the most important loca-
tions. In 1972, however, restriction to location was abolished and all assembly
enterprises in Mexico became eligible for tariff exemption, irrespective of their
location.'
8 Since then, the maquiladora industry has spread southward all over
Tariff privileges became available for all assembly enterprises except for those in regions with an
already high concentration of industry.Blbllofhek
to Instifruts fur Weifwirfsch®®
13
the country. Non-border assembly plants were first established within the border
states, namely in Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon and Sonora, then also in central and
southern places. Today, each of Mexico's 31 federal states has at least one
maquiladora plant (Christman 1993).
Non-border plants are playing an increasingly important role (Table 6). Until
now, they have grown to account for about one third of all maquiladora plants
and for more than 10 p.c. of employment. On average, they are smaller than
plants at the border. Although the entire assembly industry is growing, non-bor-
der plants are growing even faster. Both with respect to value added and pay-
roll, they grew twice as fast as border plants in the period of 1973 to 1983
(Tables 7 and A2). Non-border plants benefit from lower wages inside the
country. Thus, their payroll per employee is lower although their total payroll is
growing faster (Table 8).















































Source: Mendiola (1996); Banco de Mexico (1996a); Grunwald (1985a,
1985b).14
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 bDeflatcd by the Mexican consumer price index. CPI was
because first, the wholesale
in Mexico i;onsists primarily
constitute only a small proportion.
price index covers Mexico City only, and second, value
of wages, services and profits, while Mexican materials
Source: Grunwald (1985a).15
Increasing importance of non-border locations reflects to a large extent agglom-
erational diseconomies, which developed on the border. Border locations al-
ways had and still have the largest agglomerations of maquiladora plants. As
these agglomerations were growing continuously, they became heavily ridden
with
- bottlenecks in regional infrastructure such as roads and sewers, drain-
age and water, electricity and telecommunications, as well as short-
• ages in housing, health care and schools,
high personnel turnover,
- rising prices in markets for local goods and services, and
environmental pollution (Sanchez Ugarte 1991; Quintana 1990)."
Worst, however, were congested bridges. Congestion arose mainly because the
development of infrastructure has not kept pace with maquiladora growth/
0 This
was mainly attributed to macroeconomic shocks and major imbalances in the fi-
nancial markets, or rather considered as a consequence of the efforts to cope
with them. In the aftermath of the large devaluations of 1976 and 1982 and the
hyperinflation of the 1980s, international support — on part of the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, the US and others — was made contingent on
imposing severe restrictions on public budgets. Budget strains led to postponing
the improvement of border region infrastructure just when the maquiladora in-
dustry has been growing most dynamically (Quintana 1990). However, budget
strains can hardly be an excuse. Rather, they make the case for privately financ-
The Interamerican Development Bank designed a conversion program of several billion US dollars
to finance ecological restructuring (Handelsblatt 1995).
It is estimated that necessary improvements of infrastructure will require some 16 bill. US$. How-
ever, public funds assigned to infrastructure on both the US and the Mexican side presently ac-
count for only 3 bill. USS each (Nachrichten fur AuBenhandel 1994).ing infrastructure and they underscore the importance of, for instance, private
industrial parks.
While border locations became congested, interior locations offered advantages
in terms of a lower turnover in labour and in terms of lower wages (Haywood
1997). Furthermore, proximity to the US lost importance, partly because in-
creasing technology content made products less sensitive to transport cost,
paftlybecause technical progress and improved infrastructure lowered transport
cost. In addition, Asian, mainly Japanese, investors began locating maquiladora
plants at the pacific border, which was a favourable place to ship in materials
from the Far East.
In its move southward, the regional distribution of maquiladora industries did
not develop evenly, but rather heterogenously. Most industries are clustering at
certain locations. Assembly for transport equipment, e.g., has been concentrated
at border locations from the beginning and remained so. The most important
place is Ciudad Juarez, which in the 1990s still accounted for half of maquila-
dora employment in transport equipment. Textiles in contrast have moved in-
wards. In 1980, about four fifths of all textile assembly plants were located at
the northern border. While in 1995, more than half of the maquiladora textile
industry located in the interior, mostly grouping in Durango, in Morelos and in
the Caribbean peninsula of Yucatan. Yucatan, for instance, is attractive to US
enterprises because it offers good air fright connections to Florida. Electronic
maquiladoras, mostly Japanese, are clustering in the pacific peninsula of Baja
California and in the so-called "Mexican Silicon Valley" in Guadalajara, while
food processing maquiladoras are located in Guanajuato.17
International and Domestic Integration
Maquiladora assembly is highly integrated internationally. The first generation
of maquiladora production was fully integrated with the US but largely isolated
from the Mexican economy. This changed, however, in the course of time, es-
pecially with increasing technological diversification. In the beginning, maqui-
ladora operations were straight assembly: workers attached Part A to Part B and
assembly did not need technology. Many companies, however, which success-
fully operated their maquiladora plants, became aware that they had gathered a
good deal of experience and workers had acquired considerable skill (Mack and
Greenbaum 1983). This gave them the possibility to react to competitive pres-
sures with upgrading their production. Thus, the second generation of maquila-
dora plants began manufacturing the parts and components it had to assemble.
Mexico captured a larger share of internationally integrated production and
maquiladora assembly acquired a higher degree of vertical integration. Actually,
increasing shares of manufacturing — in contrast to simple assembly — make
the maquiladora business less labour-intensive but more skill- and technology-
intensive.
2
1 By this, maquiladora workers became the most highly skilled part of
the Mexican labour force.
In a third generation of maquiladoras, which is presently emerging, further
changes are occurring (Mack and Greenbaum 1983): export processing changes
from manufacturing simple parts and components to manufacturing complete
systems and subsequently assembling finished products, it changes' from stock-
buffering to just-in-time production and it changes from sourcing and selling
abroad to develop backward and forward links domestically. In these changes
From 1980 to 1986 the number of engineers employed in maquiladora plants rose from 9,000 to
26,000. In 1989, already 38 p.c. of maquiladora plants used integrated control and about 40,p.c.
used robots for their assembly operations (Nuhn 1994).18
border locations are taking the lead. Just-in-time production, for instance, is al-
ready playing an important role in plants located in Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez
(Carillo, quoted from Mendiola 1996).
Since maquiladora assembly has been more integrated with the US than with the
Mexican economy, it has been heavily accused to make Mexico dependent on
the US and to be failing in terms of integration with the national economy. Un-
questionably, US economic development tangibly affects the maquiladora in-
dustry. However, these effects only partially work through to the rest of the
Mexican economy and they are not necessarily detrimental. Transmission be-
tween Mexico and the US works both directly and indirectly. Direct effects re-
sult if US business cycle dynamics translate into pro-cyclical changes of labour
demand in the maquiladora industry.
2
2 Indirect, i.e anticyclical effects result
when US recession or competitive pressure induce US producers to increasingly
shift production to Mexico thus generating additional employment there. This
occurred for instance, when US automotive producers experienced a recession
from 1978 to 1982. This benefited maquiladora assembly in transport equip-
ment which at that period grew considerably faster than maquiladora assembly
on average (Mendiola 1996). Another facet of close links to the US economy is
that maquiladora assembly is less affected by domestic shocks. After the Peso
crisis in the 1980s, practically all new jobs in Mexico created were in maquila-
doras, making the industry an important shock absorber (Drucker 1990). Simi-
larly, in the recession of 1995, maquiladora assembly was the only sector that
was left unaffected and continued to develop dynamically (Handelsblatt 1995).
The elasticity of maquila employment with respect to change of US output is estimated to be 2.25
(Carillo 1991, quoted from Mendiola 1996). This is quite high as it indicates that a 1 p.c. change in
US output triggers a more than proportionate change in maquiladora employment (2.25 p.c).19
With respect to integration with the domestic economy, the only criticism which
holds good is that of poor integration of domestic suppliers. However, in order
to properly assess weak domestic integration, one has to consider first, that
outward processing on purpose and by definition establishes both backward
linkages (sourcing) and forward linkages (selling) mainly abroad rather than
domestically. Second, in the case of maquiladora assembly, regulation strongly
reinforced outward orientation. Maquiladora establishments were bound to lo-
cate at the border and tariff privileges were contingent on foreign sourcing and
foreign selling. Meanwhile, these restrictions were released or even abolished,
allowing now for both interior location, domestic sales and domestic sourcing.
As a consequence, maquiladora assembly is developing most rapidly at interior
locations and successfully sells part of its output on the domestic market.
However, backward linkages are still very weak. Presently, domestic resources
are accounting on average for less than 2 p.c. of gross national output (Table 2).
While interior plants in certain industries may be sourcing domestically to a
considerable extent, their share in total maquiladora assembly is so low that this
does not change the general picture (Table 9). The reasons for this are multiple.
First, US tariff regulation which required import duties to be paid on the value
added and second, tariff privileges for imported inputs granted on part of Mexi-
can authorities both worked as a strong disincentive to source from Mexican
suppliers. However, although these regulations have been abolished with the
NAFTA agreement becoming effective in 1994, the share of national inputs in
maquiladora operations still did not increase significantly.
The third and most important reason for missing backward linkages is that
Mexican suppliers are not competitive compared to US or other foreign enter-
prises: their prices are often too high, the quality of their products is often too
low — an impediment especially in electronics — they are often unable to meet20
delivery schedules or to keep ready sufficient production capacity. Mostly, this
lack of competitiveness results from protection and import-substitution which
had governed Mexican industrialization from the 1940s until well into the
1980s (Grunwald 1985a; Octavio Diaz 1990). Several programs were designed
to make domestic suppliers more competitive and to integrate them better with
the border economy. So far however, these programs have not produced tangi-
ble effects."

















































Such programs were first set up in the 1970s, when 600 engineers working in maquiladora assem-
bly plants went to Mexico City to show representatives of the domestic Mexican industry the type
of articles they were used to accept and to buy as inputs for their production (Haywood 1997). Re-
cent programs were designed in the beginning of the 1990s (Bcnitez II. 1990; Sanchez Ugarte
1991).21.
Integration of Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises
A large part of maquiladora assembly is undertaken by small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SME). This holds true not only for maquiladora plants in
Mexico but in most cases also for their parent companies, locating in the US or
in other industrialized countries. Also industrial parks which render locational
services are typically small in terms of employment with park management and
accounting staff mostly far below 50 people.
2'
Throughout the development of the industry, maquiladora plants have been
medium-sized on average (Table 10).
2
5 Employment per enterprise has increased
slightly over time and at present, border plants have on average some
400 employees.
M Interior plants prove to be significantly smaller, employing on
average less than 150 persons. Parent companies, too, are mostly medium-sized
enterprises. Data on foreign investors' enterprise size are not available. From
soft evidence, however, it is quite clear that predominantly medium-sized pro-
ducers take advantage of selling up assembly plants in industrial parks while
multinational enterprises constitute a minority.
Except for the period of construction.
If measured by employment, enterprises with up to 50 employees are considered small, enterprises
with up to 500 employees are considered medium size.
For 1987, the OECD reports that a third of all maquiladora plants was small. Most of the plants
with total or majority Mexican ownership were small, while the plants, with US equity were me-
dium or large, i.e. annual sales were 250,000 US$ or above (Peres Nunez 1990).22





























Source: Mendiola (1996); Banco de Mexico (1996a).
In many-aspects, maquiladora assembly produced a pattern of production shar-
ing which is quite different from what theoretical considerations and empirical
evidence would suggest for SME. Typically, cross-border activities are domi-
nated by international trade rather than by international production and small-
and medium-sized enterprises are typically much less integrated in international
production than large enterprises. However, maquiladora assembly relies, on the
one hand, on both trading and producing internationally and, on the other hand,
it favours international integration of SME. In general, one would expect that
contractual control and intermediate forms of co-ordination are the most con-
venient ways for SME to operate internationally (Schmidt 1996). The main rea-
son for preferring these shallow forms of integration is that SME cannot afford
as much risk-bearing as large enterprises can.
2' In maquiladora assembly, never-
theless, both forward and backward linkages, are typically based on deep inte-
gration, i.e. on equity control, established by capital investment.
In essence, the risk argument is the sunk-cost argument. Deep forms of integration involve capital
commitments into specific investments. If specific investments fail, the capital invested turns to be
a sunk cost that cannot be recovered (Pindyck 1991).Table 11 - Size Structure and Organization Pattern of the Maquiladora Industry
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This can be explained by the fact that, notwithstanding their limited ability to
bear risk, SME have potential advantages in international activities compared to
MNE resulting, for instance, from a higher degree of flexibility. Obviously,
maquiladora-type production sharing is taking place in a framework which ef-
ficiently reduces risk and allows SME to fully exploit their potential advan-
tages. To put it differently, for a small- or medium-sized firm the maquiladora
border network may be the only way to do business in a foreign country and to
resort to production sharing as a means to cope with global competition
(Drucker 1990). Table 11 and 12 attempt to capture the characteristics of ma-
quiladora-type production sharing and the specific division of labour which de-
veloped between foreign parent companies, their Mexican assembly plants and
industrial parks.
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- Economic Policy Framework for
Programs, decrees or










Control and transfer of foreign exchange
Establishment and operation of
maquiladora enterprises; intersectoral
commission to co-ordinate maquiladora
developments
Decentralization of the maquiladora
industry • -





US duties are levied only on the foreign
value-added contained in imports of a
specified range of goods.
An area which allows for duty-free imports
from anywhere to be manufactured and to
leave the zone duty-free if exported.
Establishing physical and social
infrastructure (streets, schools, ...).
Promoting industrial settlements and
production-oriented infrastructure.
Companies exporting 100 p.c. of their
production are eligible to import and
re-export all necessary raw materials,
components, machinery and equipment
duty free.
Requirement of registering maquiladora
establishments and defining a 20 kms zone
along the border allowing for preferential
treatment of export processing.
Enlarging the regional scope of tariff
exemption for export processing
operations anywhere in Mexico.
Specification of eligible goods.
Confirming preferences granted to
registered maquiladoras.
Allowing foreign exchange accounts to
private enterprises, obligation to report on
foreign exchange operations.
No allowance for maquiladoras in in-
dustrial agglomerations, allowance for
domestic sales, increasing national
supplies.
Defining preferential zones and offering
support for new establishments.
Simplifying administrative procedures,
speeding up the purchase of real estate by '
foreigners.
Removing barriers to trade between
Canada, the US and Mexico. Full
liberalization is planned for the year 2008.
Source: Adapted from Nuhn (1994) based on Mendez (1991), Villarreal (1988).26
IV Reasons for Success
Simple Policy Framework
The creation of the regulatory framework has been driven by close interaction,
if not to say bargain, between private actors and public authorities rather than
by authorities negotiating bilaterally. Essentially, it represents a deregulatory
approach. It is based on horizontal tariff exemptions, granted on part of Mexi-
can authorities and on part of US authorities (Table 13). It is provided that ma-
terials to be assembled can be imported to and exported from Mexico tariff-free
and that assembled products are taxed in the US only for the value added gen-
erated abroad.
In Mexico, the (de-)regulation applied to maquiladora assembly fits well into
the general stance of economic policy which became increasingly liberal. Since
1989 industrial and foreign trade policies have been outlined such that measures
are not targeting individual sectors or branches but are applicable horizontally,
i.e. industry-wide or even economy-wide (Peres Nunez 1993)."
5 Only in the
course of NAFTA negotiations, Mexico has partly reverted to sectoral policy
and has set up a special program to promote competitiveness and internationali-
zation of the textile and garment industry.
2'
However, a liberal approach to economic policy does not yet sufficiently de-
scribe a well-working assignment of responsibilities between the state and the
market. Actually, the experience with maquiladora industry also points to the
limits of the market, hence to the responsibilities which governments have to
take beyond designing rules to international trade and production. In the Mexi-
Mcxico, Ministry of Trade and Industrial Promotion (1989).
Mexico, Ministry of Trade and Industrial Promotion (1992a, 1992b).27
can border states, environmental pollution points to the importance of ade-
quately defined property rights to scarce environmental resources and congested
social infrastructure points to governments' responsibilities to provide resp. fi-
nance so-called public goods. In the case of maquiladora industry, the Mexican
government only recently began to address these problems.
Smart Private Institutions
Organization: Private Industrial Parks
Industrial parks are an important organizational device in the development of
maquiladora-type production sharing. Such parks can be seen as the hubs of in-
ternational production networks where foreign and national strands are knotted
together (Bolin 1989). However, industrial parks were not invented anew, but
have a long series of historical antecedents (Bolin 1991):
• Free Ports, already known in the middle ages, allow for duty-free
storage of goods.
* Free Trade Zones allow not only to store but to also to trade goods
(tradables) without paying duties. In a free trade zone, i.e. efficient
trade is made possible by selectively putting trade barriers out of
rule.
The first Free Zone on the Mexican side of the border has been established in 1861. It was de-
signed to keep local people from emigrating to Texas (Tamayo 1986; quoted after Weintraub
1990). In the 1930s, further duty-free zones and free perimeters were created in Sonora and Baja
California in order to permit duty-free imports of goods from the United States since at that time it
was difficult to serve the border region from the economic center around Mexico City. In order to
stimulate export industries, these zones were allowed to host Mexican manufacturing enterprises
(Bolin 1991). The first decree regulating temporary imports and exports was issued in 1958
(Grunwald 1985a).28
Export Zones and Industrial Free Zones permit production of goods
and services to be exported duty-free.
Export Processing Zones (EPZ) are specialized zones for manufac-
turing which can be organized as
- privileged zones hosting manufacturing enterprises which take
advantage of the zone's privileges, e.g. tariff-exemptions, by lo-
cating inside. These zones are fenced as duty exemptions apply
to machinery, materials and components which are used inside
the zone.
- regime-type zones hosting privileged manufacturing enterprises,
for instance maquiladora plants. As privileges apply to individ-
ual factories, customs control is exercised by inspection and
documentation only. Regime-type zones do not need nor have a
fence.
Industrial parks are a means to provide enterprises with the infra-
structure necessary for production.
3' Industrial parks are used by many
zones. They may be organized as
real estate industrial parks, which may be public or privately
owned and managed. The main service they offer to their clients
is real estate development, including buildings, streets, water,
lights, communication, security, etc.
In Nogales, Sonora, e.g., a free zone and the industrial park had been co-existing for about two
years until in 1970, the state and federal government extended the free zone already existing to in-
clude the park land (Haywood 1979).29
full service industrial parks, typically private, which go beyond
real estate services and offer also locational services and test
production.
Maquiladora assembly plants can be established inside or outside industrial
parks. Once the knowledge of how to promote a park to investors (which in-
cludes selling, leasing, financing) is spread it becomes possible to construct in-
dividual buildings for outward processing outside of parks (Bolin 1991). Never-
theless, industrial parks dominate the development of the maquiladora industry.
In 1995, there were at least 90 industrial parks in Mexico which accounted for
about 80 p.c. of maquiladora enteiprises, 67 p.c. of maquiladora employment
and 60 p.c. of maquiladora exports (Bolin 1995a)."
Specialization: Shelter Plan Arrangements
Competitive pressure forced private park managers to create competitive advan-
tages for their park as compared to other parks. They did so by offering innova-
tive and sophisticated services to their clients." The so-called Shelter Plan was
set up
u which developed the real estate industrial park towards a full service
park. The full service park is ready to perform all tasks and to render all services
necessary to overcome the differences between two sets of laws, two sets of
In 1990, 58 industrial parks were in operation and another 16 were projected. Until the 1980s, the
only significant concentration of maquiladoras almost entirely outside industrial parks was the one
in Tijuana. At the beginning of the 1990s, maquiladora production sharing took place half inside,
half outside of export processing zones (Bolin 1991).
"We are learning that an EPZ, though it offers land, infrastructure and buildings, is not primarily a
real state business. Instead it is a service business to attract clients which, incidentally, require land
and buildings to operate." (Bolin 1989: 5).
The first Shelter plan came into operation 1969 at PINS A, Nogales (Parque Industrial Nogales
S.A.).30
languages and two sets of cultures.
1
5 Under a Shelter Plan arrangement, the park
manages all the maquiladora plants' relationships with the local community and
with local governments. A unique feature of the Shelter Plan is that it goes even
further and offers potential clients to run a test manufacturing before making le-
gal commitments, which would mean to invest and incorporate in Mexico. The
park provides all facilities and services to run the test including (Bolin 1977a)
- rent of temporary factory space
contracting temporary employees
- supervision and maintenance
- customs and crossings
- clearing immigration documents for foreign staff people
accounting
-. controlling permits
training of foreign plant managers for their new environment (labour
relations, administration, customs and crossings)
- representation with Mexican and US governments
incorporation with the Mexican authorities if the client decides to set
up a subsidiary in the park.
3*
The client usually only provides his materials, his machinery and some staff
people for technical supervision. This limits his risk exposure to the cost of
sending these items and persons to Mexico. Test production is done such that
On this, the Shelter Plan has been characterized as a 'cultural-shock absorber' (Kent 1971; Bolin
1977a).
Actually, in this type of production sharing " ... the management job is split in two." (Drucker
1990). The foreigner runs the business part, while locals ran the social task.31
the client focuses entirely on the manufacturing process, while the park man-
agement undertakes all interactions with the local environment. This allows the
client to test his production know-how in the Mexican business environment. If
the test yields positive results in terms of product quality, test facilities can be
expanded so as to produce commercial quantities and if this works out, too, the
client has to decide whether to come in, set up his own company with the al-
ready trained personnel, or to continue subcontracting. Should the test not yield
positive results, the client may withdraw (Haywood 1979).
Of course, Shelter services have their cost. However, the fee a park charges
from its client is usually smaller than the cost the client would incur when man-
aging the foreign environment himself. This cost saving may be most important
for small- and medium-si/xd enterprises. For them the costs of operating abroad
are high and often even prohibitive such that they abstain from international in-
tegration or resort to shallow forms of integration. Big multinationals, in con-
trast, may not depend on Shelter services, though even some of them prefer to
set up their operations within this scheme (Drucker 1990). With respect to de-
signing an adequate policy framework for the promotion of international inte-
gration, the Shelter Plan has a very clear-cut implication: its highlights the role
of private promotion
3
7 and the importance private risk taking.
"At the beginning, all one can sell is the history or reputation of the backers. ... You need to get to
people who understand why services are needed." (Bolin. quoted from Haywood 1979). "From his
experience in Nogales, he understood where his potential clients were. Using a special computer
program, he sorted out United States Customs and Department of Commerce information on
806/807 trade, isolated the industries most actively involved, and sent mailings to each company in
the industry. He followed these up with telephone calls and area meetings. He felt that such inten-
sive and directed efforts were difficult for government to mount. Hew governments accepted the
high costs incurred in successful promotion, (Ibid) "Government, in contrast, did not understand
the way US firms make decisions. Of course, they will make sure that the economics of the project
have are sound. But for a location to gain an edge over competing locations, it is crucial to offer a
style of life an expatriate manager could enjoy — houses, golf courses, holes, communications, ..."
(Haywood 1979). For a US company to go abroad, the so-called "soft" characteristics are highly
important.32
In Shelter Plan arrangements the services of promotion and risk taking are sub-
ject to sophisticated service subcontracting. The park management is (subcon-
tracted by the foreign client to render him a certain set of services. The logic of
the Shelter Plan is to reduce foreign manufacturers' risks in entering inter-
national production sharing — or to put it differently: it reduces the sunk-cost
barrier he faces towards foreign investment, thus it induces potentially interest-
ed manufacturers to actually step out of their national boundaries into a new
environment. The reason which makes the Shelter Plan work is that it relies on
agents' specialization according to their comparative advantages: the manu-
facturer specializes in manufacturing, while locals do the local businesses. For
them, it is much less costly to manage location-specific tasks and risks. In es-
sence, the full service industrial park shelters the foreign client from the local
environment in such a way that he can nearly operate as if he were at home.
Maquiladora-type production sharing constitutes network relations among do-
mestic and foreign firms. Network activities have been explained by inter-
organizational theories as an effective means to facilitate entry in international
markets (Gerling 1997). They can be seen as an attempt of enterprises to inter-
nalize otherwise external dependencies of resources so as to reduce uncertainty.
In entering international markets, information on the yet unknown business en-
vironment (law, language, culture, politics) represents such a strategically im-
portant resource. The specific feature of maquiladora-type production sharing,
namely Shelter Plan arrangements, can be seen as a device to provide resp. to
get access to these resources. Resource access is provided within a network
structure — or even constitutes this very network — but, interestingly in this
case, still relies on market exchange rather than vertical integration into enter-33
prises' hierarchies.
3
8 Actually, agents reduce dependency, hence uncertainty, by
mutually exchanging strategically important resources: foreign investors depend
on location-specific information, industrial parks on investment capital. In a
way, uncertainty is removed or replaced by mutual dependency. This mutual
dependency can be seen as the stabilizing factor in this setting.
Integration: Multiple Forms of Ownership and Control
As there are no restrictions to foreign ownership, maquiladora assembly can be
realized in many different forms (Opalin 1990):
• The maquiladora plant can be operated as a legally independent sub-
sidiary of a foreign parent company. This makes the maquiladora
plant vertically integrated with the foreign company and subject to
ownership control. This setting requires the maquiladora plant to be
incorporated in Mexico and the foreign parent company to make a
capital commitment.
• The maquiladora enterprise can be integrated by subcontracting.
Then again it is vertically integrated with the foreign enterprise but
governed by contractual control. This setting does not require the
foreign enterprise to make a capital commitment. Subcontracting may
be
- production subcontracting such that the foreign enterprise sub-
contracts a fully or majority Mexican enterprise
Other network-based solutions to cope with resource dependency have been developed in South-
East Asia, in the Pear! River Delta, and in northern Italy, in the so-called industrial districts
(Schmidt 1997; Gerling 1997). In these cases, however, risk reduction is brought about by informal
links rather than by market exchange (Table A4).34
• '' • - to assemble parts or components delivered by the foreign




- to buy inputs (raw materials, parts and components) on any
market and to carry out subsequent manufacturing. This
scheme comes close to outright exporting.
to manufacture the parts or components which subsequently
are to be assembled or manufactured.
Each of these variants can be realized as
- idle capacity subcontracting such that the foreign enterprise
contracts for only idle or excess capacities of a Mexican
manufacturer who mainly sells to the domestic market or
who does assembly for two or more foreign firms.
J
9
so-called captive subcontracting, when the Mexican firm
produces for only one foreign company.
- service subcontracting such that the foreign enterprise respec-
tively its Mexican subsidiary subcontracts with an industrial park
to render real estate services and/or to render Shelter services. In
this setting, control by relational contracting is governing hori-
zontal integration between a service and a production enterprise.
Mostly, maquiladora plants are operated as subsidiaries. In the late 1970s, the
majority of them was controlled by foreign capital which nearly entirely came
from the US.
4
0 Over time, the share of non-US investors has increased. In the
In fact, most firms are doing assembly for two or more foreign firms (Grunwald 1985a).
Data on this issue are inconsistent, reporting shares of foreign capital to vary between 48 p.c. and
90 p.c. Nevertheless, the share of domestic capital in the maquiladora industry is assessed to be
substantial (Grunwald 1985a).35
late 198O's, more than half of all maquiladora plants were wholly or majority
US-owned, about 40 p.c. were wholly or majority Mexican owned and a minor-
ity of about 4 p.c. was owned by Japanese, German or Spanish firms (Peres
Nunez 1990). Most non-US investments were and still are undertaken by over-
seas firms which already had established a subsidiary in the US. The US sub-
sidiary then sets up an assembly plant in Mexico, predominantly to serve the' US
market. Ownership of industrial parks in Mexico is mostly private, with either
full Mexican capital or as a Mexican-US joint venture.
V Maquiladora Assembly as a Pathway to Liberalization
In its beginnings, the maquiladora assembly industry was promoted by granting
certain tariff privileges. With economic liberalization, however, it loses its ad-
vantage of being relatively little regulated compared to its environment. It is
controversial among economists if the maquiladora assembly industry will
benefit or not from liberalization. Possibly, the maquiladora case could be used
as an excuse for not eliminating remaining barriers to trade. This, however, does
not seem to be the case in Mexico. On the contrary, granting tariff exemptions
to maquiladora enterprises has only taken the first brick out of the protectionist
wall which surrounded the Mexican economy for decades. More than anything
else, it seems that economic success of partially liberalizing trade has paved the
way to a broader approach of liberalization and towards a deeper integration
into the world economy
4'. With removing regulations, the concept of maquila-
dora export production can be employed anywhere in the country and it increas-
ingly serves as a port of entry for new investors in Mexico (Bolin 1992).
"... this 180-degree turn would not have been possible but for Mexico's one economic success: the
maquiladoras, or industrial parks, ..." (Drucker 1990).36
Limited economic opening has exposed part of the Mexican economy to inter-
national competition. This forced enterprises to develop their competitiveness
so as to take advantage of low labour cost and proximity to the US market. They
successfully learned to exploit this potential and even went beyond: by invent-
ing the Shelter Plan as a special device of labour division between nationals and
foreigners, they created further competitive advantages. Economic opening to-
wards full liberalization can be expected to work in the same way for the rest of
the economy: It increases competitive pressures and, as a response, enterprises
increase their competitiveness.
In the framework of the NAFTA Agreement, which establishes free trade be-
tween Mexico, Canada and the US, maquiladora enterprises are no longer
privileged by exemption from Mexican tariffs, but win from US regulation be-
ing removed. For one thing, import duties to be paid in the US on value added
generated in Mexico will be eliminated. This makes it attractive for maquilado-
ras to use more domestic inputs when exporting to the U.S.as it makes domestic
suppliers more competitive. Thus, deregulation in the US favours domestic in-
tegration of maquiladora assembly. Additionally, maquiladora enterprises get
full access to sell their products in the domestic markets which again favours
domestic integration. Actually, the regional pattern of sourcing and selling has
already been tangibly affected (Bolin 1995b). Full liberalization may turn out to
be the most effective instrument for fully integrating the initially isolated
maquiladora industry into the Mexican economy.
VI Conclusions
Opening the economic border offered both chances but also exerted pressure on
the Mexican economy: on the one hand, it opened the way to benefit from loca-
tional advantages such as abundant labour and a favourable location, on the37
other hand it exposed part of the national economy to international competition
which uncovered any lack of competitiveness. This exerted competitive pres-
sure on national enterprises in such a way that they could only exploit their
comparative advantages if they found ways and means to cure or offset their
competitive disadvantages such as small size, lack of finance, lack of manage-
rial or technological know-how.
They successfully did so and the maquiladora industry developed remarkably
with respect to both regional distribution and technological diversification. Its
dynamics essentially initiated modernization of the Mexican economy by inte-
grating it internationally. Reasons for these achievements are: first, private
agents have developed organizational devices which support specialization ac-
cording to comparative advantages. This may be regarded as a necessary condi-
tion for success. Second, they designed ownership and control such as to fully
benefit from specialization. This may be regarded as a further necessary condi-
tion. Furthermore, authorities have designed a sound regulatory framework.
This may be considered as a sufficient condition. Regulation in general is lib-
eral and favours outward-orientation. Nevertheless, it heavily relies on one ma-
jor restriction, namely restricting outward mobility of Mexican workers. This is
essential for maintaining — at least short- and medium term — the factor price
differential in wages.
However, there are still tasks to be tackled. First, state authorities have to define
property rights to scarce environment resources so as to prevent overly pollu-
tion, second, authorities have to care for an adequate supply of social and basic
industrial infrastructure and third, adequate deregulation should allow for fur-
ther integration of maquiladora assembly with the rest of the national economy.
With respect to the latter, for national suppliers a free-trade agreement like
NAFTA and preferential treatment as by the European Union may work in the38
same way as tariff duty exemption once did for the maquiladora industry: to
open the way for international integration and to put them in a position to ex-
ploit, rcsp. develop their comparative advantages. This is an intricate task — for
enterprises in developing and transition economies alike. However, they are not
left on their own: They can get support, most effectively when choosing busi-
ness partners with coincident interests.
Finally, for small- and medium-sized enterprises — in transition and market
economies alike — the main message of maquiladora experiences comes out of
the Shelter Plan: the maquiladora case proves that small- and medium-sized
enterprises can indeed overcome the risk barrier to international integration and
that one means to remove this barrier is marketable services as rendered, e.g., in
Shelter Plan arrangements. However, this does not seem to be the only effective
way. Alternatively, SMEs' international integration may be facilitated by means
of informal contacts among members of the business community, as for in-
stance, in the Pearl River Delta (Schmidt 1997). In each case, specific condi-
tions have to be met. For relying on informal contacts, one has to have close
cultural ties or even family relationship, in short: strong trust among business
partners. For relying on market exchange, one has to have agents who are both
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3 Wood and paper products
4 Chemical products
5 Footwear and leather
products
6 Stone, clay and glass
products
7 Iron and steel
manufacturing
8 Fabricated metal products
9 Non-electrical machinery
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Source: Mendez et al. (1991).41
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Table A3 - Factors Motivating Locational Choice of Maquiladora Plants in








43 p.c. of local maquiladora plants
Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua
Edward and Hofman, 1987
24 enterprises representing
83 p.c. of enterprises and
87 p.c. of employment of local
maquiladora plants
Most important
• Low cost of transport
• Low cost of labour
• Easy control of production and
commercial operations
• Availability of labour
• Low cost of labour
• Proximity to the US
• Availability of labour
• Low cost of initial investment





Not important, but favourable
• Stability of the (federal) Mexican
government
• Behaviour of labour unions
• Availability of good industrial
installations
• High productivity
• Co-operation of Mexican
authorities
• No restrictions to financial
transfers
Especially important to high-tech
maquiladoras
• Availability of Mexican
technicians, their readiness, ability
and effort to become acquainted
with complex computerized
processes
Source: Romero and Paredez (1993).43
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